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616 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
MARGINAL STOCKHOLDERS AND IMPLIED TAX RATES 
LeRoy D. Brooks and Charles E. Edwards* 
In this REVIEW some years ago, Edwin Elton and 
Martin Gruber (1970) used the concepts of market 
equilibrium and differential tax rates between capital 
gains and dividend income to structure a theoretical 
model which they then used empirically to estimate 
marginal stockholder tax rates. Their specification of 
an equilibrium condition is appropriate for a security 
seller who qualifies for preferential tax treatment of 
capital gains. However, their assumption that such a 
stockholder is the marginal stockholder in a market 
equilibrium is questionable. This assumption, along 
with disregard of transactions and other costs, is es- 
sential to their empirical derivation of stockholder tax 
rates. This note presents an alternative explanation of 
their empirical results. 
The Elton and Gruber Model 
As specified by Elton and Gruber (E & G), a stock- 
holder is indifferent to the timing of his sale of shares if 
his expected wealth is not affected by the transaction. 
Indifference results when the net after-tax proceeds 
from the sale of shares before they go ex-dividend 
equals the combination of after-tax dividend and 
after-tax stock sale proceeds obtained by not selling 
the shares until the ex-dividend date. In this case, 
PB - tc (PB - PC) = PA - tc (PA - PC) 
+ D(1-to) (1) 
where 
PB = price on the day before the stock goes ex- 
dividend, 
PA = price of the stock on the ex-dividend day, 
PC = price at which the stock was purchased, 
tc = tax rate on capital gains, 
to = tax rate on ordinary (dividend) income, and 
D = amount of the dividend. 
Rearranging (1) they obtain 
(PB- PA)/D = (1 - to)/(1 - tC) (2) 
from which the statistic (PB - PA)/D represents the 
ex-dividend pricing behavior which causes a stock- 
holder with a particular set of tax rates tc and to to be 
indifferent to the timing of the sale of stock. 
Explicit in their model development and interpreta- 
tion of the statistic (PB - PA)/D is the assumption that 
the marginal sellers of stock qualify for long-term capi- 
tal gains tax treatment. 
In a rational market the fall in price on the ex-dividend 
day should reflect the value of dividends vis-a-vis capital 
gains to the marginal stockholders. Since dividends and 
capital gains are taxable at different rates, the relative tax 
rate on these two types of income affect the decision. 
(E & G, 1970, p. 69) 
The assertion that capital gains and dividends of the 
marginal stockholder are taxed differentially is main- 
tained in their empirical analysis to derive implied tax 
rates. For the period covered by their empirical study, 
they observe that t, is one half of to or 25%, whichever 
is lower. From this assumption and (PB - PA)/D statis- 
tics, they empirically derive implied tax rates of the 
marginal stockholder both for their entire sample and 
for various dividend yield classes arranged by deciles. 
Model Extensions 
Unless entry into the market equilibrating process is 
restricted, an assumption that the marginal stock- 
holder has preferential long-term capital gains tax 
treatment may be unsound. The "equilibrium" implied 
by the assumed preferential tax treatment of capital 
gains permits possible increases in wealth for non- 
preferentially taxed investors. In a pre- to post- 
dividend-record-date-decision environment, long-term 
capital gains stockholders prefer a dollar of capital 
gains to a dollar of dividends because of the differential 
tax advantage of capital gains. Since investors lose a 
portion of their preferential long-term capital gains tax 
shield at the ex-dividend date, the statistic (PB - 
PA)/D is expected to be less than one if long-term 
capital gains sellers establish the market equilibrium 
since, in equation (2), t, < to. 
Unlike long-term capital gains shareholders, ordi- 
nary income (short-term capital gains) and tax free 
shareholders do not lose preferential tax shields when 
making decisions to sell shares relative to the timing of 
the ex-dividend date. Ordinary income and tax free 
shareholders are possible marginal entrants since they 
may increase their wealth under pricing conditions 
which would otherwise result if only long-term capital 
gains shareholders entered the market equilibrating 
process. Two principal classes of potential sellers are 
now considered.1 
Received for publication November 27, 1978. Revision ac- 
cepted for publication January 7, 1980. 
* University of South Carolina. 
1 Other potential entrants might also impact upon the 
equilibrium statistic (PB - PA)/D. The impact of potential 
purchasers is considered in the appendix. 
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Non-preferentially Taxed, Sunk-Cost Sellers 
The ordinary income or tax free (short- or long- 
term) seller for whom PC is also a sunk cost is very 
similar to the long-term preferentially-taxed sunk-cost 
seller postulated for equation (2) (for whom t, < t,). 
The non-preferentially taxed seller, however, is one 
whose transaction either has no tax effects (t, = to = 0) 
or whose purchase of stock was not sufficiently remote 
in time to qualify for preferential capital gains tax 
treatment (t, = t,). In a perfect market, with entry of 
non-preferentially taxed sunk-cost stockholders, the 
expected equilibrium statistic is 
(PB - PA)/D = 1. (3) 
Since t, = to, the equilibrium condition in this case is 
invariant to tax rates. Although the long-term capital 
gains seller requires the pricing behavior (PB- PA)/D 
< 1 for indifference, the non-preferentially taxed seller 
may be expected to enter the market up to a point 
where (PB - PA) = D. Thus, the pricing behavior 
toward which the long-term capital gains seller is indif- 
ferent is not a matter of indifference to the non- 
preferentially taxed seller. 
For example, let to = 36.5% and t, = 18.25%, which 
correspond closely to the rates derived by E & G from 
their empirically observed statistic (PB - PA)/D = 
.7767. In an E & G proposed equilibrium, equation (2), 
a stock with PB = $40 and D = $.50 has in equilibrium 
PA = $39.61. A non-preferentially taxed shareholder, 
having already decided to sell shares, must now de- 
termine the more appropriate timing of sale. He can 
either sell his shares at PB = $40 or wait to close out his 
position the following day at PA = $39.61, thereby also 
obtaining D = $.50. By postponing sale one day, 
wealth is increased by $. 11 per share for the tax free 
institution or $.07 per share after taxes for the ordinary 
income short-term stockholder. The potential gain is 
greater at higher dividend yields, as illustrated in table 
1 under hypothetical E & G assumptions of equilib- 
rium conditions. 
Since non-preferentially taxed sellers can increase 
their wealth under the E & G specified equilibrium of 
equation (2), the specification for indifference based 
on long-term capital gains sellers may not represent a 
final market equilibrium. Non-preferentially taxed 
sellers entering the market can effect a new equilib- 
rium price, being willing to accept a lower PA relative 
to PB, thereby displacing long-term sellers at the mar- 
gin. 
The Arbitrager 
Another possible, and potentially very important, 
entrant into the equilibrating process is the arbitrager 
seeking to profit from buying at PB and selling at PA 
while also receiving D. For entry of a short-term arbi- 
TABLE 1.-POTENTIAL ONE-DAY GAIN IN WEALTH FOR 
NON-PREFERENTIALLY TAXED SELLERSa 
Annual Gain in Wealth as a Percentage 
Dividend of Share Price 
Yield t0 = 0 to = 36.5% 
1% .06% .03% 
3 .17 .11 
5 .28 .18 
8 .45 .28 
10 .56 .35 
a Where column two is for a tax-free institution and column three is for an 
ordinary income short-term shareholder. 
trager, a (PB - PA) < D differential must be sufficient to 
cover "in and out" transactions costs and tax effects. 
If the equilibrium pricing behavior were as specified in 
equation (2) with t, < to, the short-term arbitrager 
potentially could obtain a gain, G, which must also 
cover his opportunity costs of investment. Since t, = to 
for a short-term buyer and seller, the required return 
for entry is 
G(1 0)PA( - tor) to[PA( tr) PB(1 + tr)] 
+ D (1 - to) - PB (1 + tr) (4) 
where tr is the effective rate of transactions cost rela- 
tive to selling price per share. The cost may be viewed 
as that which applies to an economic order quantity, 
probably round lots, and may include both fixed and 
variable components. Equation (4) reduces to 
PB - PA tr (PB + PA) + G 
D D (5) 
Ordinary investors are unlikely to have sufficiently 
low transactions costs to encourage their participation 
in the market equilibrating process. However, the po- 
tential entry of "floor traders," who, as Exchange 
members, pay reduced brokerage commissions on 
purchases and sales on their own account, can not 
easily be ruled out. Their transactions costs are near 
zero, although they pay Federal and State transfer 
taxes usually amounting to a few cents on shares they 
sell. Their entry at the margin is consistent with an 
expected statistic (PB - PA)/D < 1 to cover any re- 
quired transactions and opportunity costs. Thus, an 
empirical finding of (PB - PA)/D < 1 is not necessarily 
a function of t, and t0, since, again, there is no differen- 
tial tax on capital gains versus ordinary income. 
Impact of Additional Entrants 
Markets in reality may be less than perfect. A possi- 
ble set of conditions may be hypothesized to support 
using the statistic (PB - PA)/D to derive estimates of 
marginal stockholder tax rates. Sound estimates of tax 
rates might be derived if non-preferentially taxed 
sellers do not displace long-term sellers at the margin 
in a market equilibrating process. This might happen if 
618 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
1. non-preferentially taxed investors do not have an 
adequate number of shares or capital to effect a 
final equilibrium, 
2. the expected return differential, (PA + D) - PB, 
is insufficient to cover the associated costs of 
entry, 
3. the potential non-preferentially taxed entrants 
are operating nonoptimally (inefficient or imper- 
fect markets), 
4. market or Exchange trading rules prohibit 
sufficient entry of floor traders to materially af- 
fect equilibrium, or 
5. by coincidence the costs of other classes of en- 
trants, such as floor traders, result in the same 
equilibrium pricing. 
Transactions costs, as noted previously, are likely to 
discourage entry of ordinary investors as arbitragers; 
but floor traders whose transactions costs are minimal 
may not be similarly discouraged unless their opportu- 
nity costs are high. Perhaps more importantly, non- 
preferentially taxed sunk-cost sellers (including per- 
haps some large institutions) seem no more likely to be 
excluded by the above conditions than long-term capi- 
tal gains sellers. Some of the above conditions might 
be influential in less than perfect markets, but probably 
no more so for non-preferentially taxed sellers than for 
long-term preferentially taxed sellers. The end result 
may be a mixture of long- and short-term entrants into 
the market equilibrating process. 
Clientele Effects 
In arranging their data by deciles according to divi- 
dend yields (D/P), E & G observed a generally in- 
creasing statistic (PB - PA)/D with increasing yields, 
which they interpreted as evidence of a tax "clientele 
effect." The higher the yield, the higher was the statis- 
tic, and the lower the implied tax bracket of the margi- 
nal stockholder, except for the two highest D/P de- 
ciles for which E & G reported indeterminate tax rates. 
The increasing statistic perhaps partly reflects a 
clientele effect. However, if entry of non-pref- 
erentially taxed sellers occurs, an alternative ex- 
planation for the increasing statistic is available. From 
equation (3), a statistic (PB - PA)/D =1 is what 
should be expected in equilibrium with rational non- 
preferentially taxed sellers at the margin. E & G's 
reported statistics for the higher D/P deciles approach 
or exceed 1.0 (E & G, 1970, table 3). These results are 
consistent with the expected entry by non-pref- 
erentially taxed investors.2 Perceived gains are po- 
tentially greater on higher yielding stocks (as shown in 
table 1) and are more likely to be deemed worthy of 
pursuit under real-world conditions of less than perfect 
knowledge. Thus, the likelihood and extent of non- 
preferentially taxed sellers' entry is potentially greater 
for high D/P stocks. Hence, the (PB - PA)/D statistic 
may be larger for the higher D/P deciles because of 
entry of non-preferentially taxed sellers,3 and not 
necessarily from a tax-rate clientele effect of long-term 
preferentially taxed sellers. 
Conclusions 
E & G created an inventive approach to estimating 
marginal stockholder tax rates. Unfortunately for 
those who desire a convenient procedure, their es- 
timating procedure is of doubtful accuracy. We would 
have no reservations regarding use of their methodol- 
ogy for estimating tax rates if we were assured that 
marginal sellers of all shares in a sample of stocks 
going ex-dividend were long-term capital gains sellers. 
However, if some displacement of long-term capital 
gains sellers results, from entry of non-preferentially 
taxed sellers at the margin for some stocks, the accu- 
racy of their procedure is questionable. Furthermore, 
if non-preferentially taxed holders were fully to dis- 
place long-term capital gains holders as sellers at the 
margin, no inferences of tax rates can be made, as may 
be seen in the equilibrium condition of equation (3). 
A statistic (PB- PA)/D < 1 may reflect the influence 
of a floor trader with transactions and opportunity 
costs to be covered. If perchance the floor trader is the 
determining influence at the margin, again no infer- 
ences can be made regarding tax rates. 
The relationships determining the pricing statistic 
are most likely more complex than postulated by E & 
G. Only if potential entrants other than long-term capi- 
tal gains sellers are fully excluded, which seems un- 
likely, can accurate statements be made regarding 
marginal stockholder tax rates using E & G's method- 
ology. Biased by the probable entry of others besides 
long-term capital gains sellers into the market equili- 
brating process, their approach at best may only par- 
tially capture the effects of tax rate differentials be- 
tween ordinary and long-term capital gains income. 
It follows that E & G's summary statements on the 
cost of retained earnings, stockholder tax-rate clien- 
tele effects, and market rationality of high tax bracket 
shareholders should be viewed with considerable cau- 
tion. Additionally, caution should be exercised in 
using their methodology to estimate tax rates until 
more conclusive evidence is obtained. Reliable esti- 
mates of marginal tax rates might better be obtained by 
2 The equilibrium statistic for the non-preferentially taxed 
sunk-cost seller is (PB - PA)/D = 1/(1 - tr) when transac- 
tions costs, tr, are considered. If, for example, tr = .01, the 
equilibrium statistic for the seller is 1.01 rather than 1.0. 
3 This perhaps is why E & G's calculated implied tax rates 
that decrease substantially with increasing dividend yields are 
not strongly supported by a recent study using a different 
methodology (Lewellen et al., 1978). 
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sampling and direct examination of stockholders' tax 
returns along with their stock purchase and sales activ- 
ity. 
APPENDIX 
Equilibrium Statistics for Security Purchasers 
For every seller there must be a buyer. A buyer's indiffer- 
ence to timing of share acquisition occurs when the after-tax 
present values of the two decisions, whether at PB or PA, are 
equivalent: 
FD + P(1 tr) - tC(n)[Pn(1 
- tr) - PB(i 
+ tr)] 
FD + ~~~~~~n 
H (1 + ki) 
i=l 
+ D(1 - to) - PB(1 + tr) = 
FD + Pn( tr) - tc(n)[Pn(l 
- tr) - PA(1 + tr)] 
f1 (1 + ki) 
PA(1 + tr) (A-1) 
where ki is an investor's after-tax risk adjusted discount rate 
for period i, Pn is the expected share price at n, which is the 
investor's expected holding time horizon, FD is the after-tax 
present value of the dividend to time horizon n, and tc(n) is the 
investor's expected tax rate for period n. Equation (A-1) 
reduces to 
PB -PA iAt2 
D (1 + tr)(I - tc) (A-2) 
where 
tc(n) 
tc = _n 
(1 + ki) 
i=1 
Interpretation of the (PB - PA)/D statistic is thus impacted by 
the buyer's time horizon and anticipated future capital gains 
tax rates. 
If the market is restricted to long-term capital gains sellers 
and buyers, the ordinary income tax rate, to, and the capital 
gains rate, tc, can not be easily derived from the (PB - PA)/D 
statistic if, as can be persuasively argued, the long-term pur- 
chaser impacts on the equilibrium statistic. Even with 
simplifying assumptions of a constant required return, k, and 
tc(n) = .5to, we can not assume that tc = .5to for an intended 
long-term buyer. Because of the discounting effect, tc < .5tK 
except perhaps for very short holdings. However, very short 
holdings are likely to result in ordinary tax on capital gains. 
Thus, estimates of to and tc in equation (A-2) can not be 
conveniently derived by assuming tc = .5to. Extreme condi- 
tions can be specified with tc -O 0 as n oo or k - oc, and tc 
.5to as n -O 0 or k -O 0. 
Without additional information, derivation of accurate 
point estimates of to from the statistic (PB - PA)/D is not 
possible if the long-term purchaser of a security establishes 
the equilibrium position. Additionally, if tc < .5t0, the E & G 
estimate of tax rates is overstated. Displacement at the mar- 
gin among long-term holders would tend toward shorter time 
horizon holders, since (PB - PA)/D-* (1 - to)/(1 - tc) as tc 
-* .5to. This expectation is consistent with E & G's assump- 
tion that tc -* .5to and the long-term capital gain seller's 
equilibrium condition, equation (2). 
If the purchaser's intended holding period is short, result- 
ing in ordinary income tax on capital gains and tc to, 
equation (A-2) reduces to 1/(1 + tr), which is approximately 
equal to the short-term seller's equilibrium 1/(1 - tr) if tr is 
small. Since this equilibrium condition is (PB - PA)/D = 1, 
displacement of long-term holders seems likely. 
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PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY IN U.S. MANUFACTURING: 
A LINEAR PROGRAMMING APPROACH 
Henry T. Burley* 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the linear 
programming (LP) activity analysis approach devel- 
oped from the Farrell (1957) efficiency system, and 
thus investigate productive efficiency implications in 
some recently published four factor aggregate U.S. 
manufacturing data. 
This approach, whilst it does not permit determina- 
tion of statistical significance, has some advantages in 
that it does not require additive separability of factors 
in the production function, or the stability of own or 
cross price elasticities, and avoids some statistical es- 
timation problems arising from multicollinearity in n 
factor data. The LP approach yields interesting in- 
sights resulting from its solution value, optimal basis 
and slacks. The analysis in the foregoing simple formu- 
lation, however, does not allow formal distinction be- 
tween productivity increase and returns to scale ef- 
fects; it simply deals with the one category-produc- 
tive efficiency. 
The data arise out of an earlier Berndt and Wood 
(1975) study which estimates a translog cost function 
relating total cost as determined by gross output P, and 
Received for publication May 15, 1978. Revision accepted 
for publication November 5, 1979. 
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